Hi,
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinThe Mk1 sold quite well. it was the leasers that were unhappy.
The mark 1 wasn't enough against all the hype generated for the 787.
Yes, hype can be used in board meetings and shaving sessions for shareholders
but hype does not fly well.
Boeing placed their historic reputation for the dreamliner bet .. and _lost_!
Post by JF MezeiYes, Airbus may have realised that the 787 was more hype. Even Boeing
had admitted that modern aluminium could yield equivalent weight for
fuselage skin compared to carbon fibre.
However, at the end of the day, airlines do get hooked by the hype and
also by the numbers. The 330 couldn't comfortably be 9 across, while the
787 could, and that makes a big difference in seating capacity with some
20-25 more passengers. So widening the 330 to the 350 did change the
financial aspects quite a bit. And making its capacity bigger than the
787-8 also made a difference, especially now that the desired 787-9 is
still way off into the future (does Boeing even have target dates ?)
In fairnes, the 350 is still more varpouware than hardware, while the
787 is very near commercial service. At a similar stage of development,
the 787 was still a stellar airplane with incredible performance and
on-time delivery.
The performance was never that stellar. It was stellar in the relation
to the 767 yesterdecades plane by all rekogning.
You are projecting from Boeing to Airbus performance as if Airbus has
ever had Boeing as a leading example. This was never the case and
is imho an inadequate accessment. Same with the lessons learned information
which for Airbus predominantly was a "we told you so!"
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe Kleinand a new type was shoehorned into the A330/787 and 777/A340 cleavage.
Voila A350XWB. The reused type number is missleading.
I think that building a plane that can combine both 330 and 340s and
provide the mid capacity between 321 and 380 was smart. Perhaps a 330
with new engines could have replaced the 340.
A340 and A330 are already one type of plane passing through the same assembly
line.
The A330 is an A340 with only two engines hung and two Thrustlevers removed ;-)
( I think this was a brilliant move by Airbus. Depending on ETOPS evolution
and engine sfc and thrust ranges available the production and to some part
the product could be adapted to the market. The -500 and -600 4holers were
needed in part to push Boeing to pressure FAA for more ETOPS time )
Post by JF MezeiBut at the end of the day, Airbus is still selling more 330s than it is
350s, and when the 350 will be closer to real hardware, Airbus will be
selling more 350s than 330s.
Boeing has made the market shy imho.
Post by JF MezeiThere is however a big question mark on whether Airbus will be able to
manage the A350 deliveries with minimal delays.
That is open, bit if it will be lot better managed and orderly ( and shorter )
than the set of each time "completely unexpected" delays for the 787.
Post by JF MezeiThe fuselage concepts
may be less radical than on the 787 and they may not have to worry about
a cylinder from one compamy fitting perfectly inside the cylinder made
by another company. But there is still much room for potential problems.
Have you seen the movie where they snap together the first shipset (
fuselage sections, wings, .. ) for the A380 ?
Just a couple of steel leafs for guidance, thats all.
Post by JF MezeiHaving said this, Airbus learned from the 380 and also from the 787.
Just as Boeing learned from Airbus' mistakes with the A320 so when its
first FBW aircraft came out (the 777), it didn't suffer from too many
glitches.
What major FBW glitches did Airbus encounter in your oppinion?
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinNo. Airbus had much better understanding what plastics could do and
what they could not do.
Airbus was also strapped for cash, not knowing about how WTO would rule
on subsidies, and not knowing how it could get cash to build a totally
new aircraft. A facelift for the A330 was easier to finance so it was
their first choice.
The WTO stuff was and is political posturing without major consequence
beyond vast amounts of cash sunk in lawyers. In the long run it may hurt
Boeing but I don't think it will have much impact on Airbus.
( Even if this is due seen differently in the US imho due to lack of understanding
and the inability to back away from a jingoistic position.)
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinAirbus was factual and truthfull in stating that the construction priciples
behind the dreamliner were not thought out well and would not harvest the
expected gains.
Obviously, it did not have sufficient credibility to convince Udvar-Hazy
and others that its conservative 330 was more realistic than Boeing's
revolutionary 787. Even if the 787 had only a fraction of the promised
advantages, it would likely still make the 330 less competitive and
Airbus would lose many sales in the long term.
Airbus missjudged the power of hype completely.Boeing is much better at
playing that game than Airbus. ceeded.
Post by JF MezeiAnd there were economic reasons to get a wider fuselage since adding an
extra seat per row would not onlty catch up with the 787 but also
surpass it. And when you look at the main advantage of the 350 is that
it is larger than the 787, especially with the 787-900 delayed for so long.
From my perspective the XWB faction won because a mirror product does not
make sense. Your old product either survives with minor changes or not.
No idea what delays Airbus expected to happen with certainty.
If you read the lessons pdf Airbus was certain that Boeing would not be
able to attain even marginaly acceptable production rates in the years
after EIS ( EIS as planned ). Looks like this has not changed much after
3 years idly winding carbon fibres.
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinThe first ~500 were gifted away. Jon Ostrower researched the numbers.
Wonder why LH, historically a strong boeing (now AB equal ) buyer, never
made a commitment to the 787?
American airlines is also a loyal Boeing customer and certaintly wasn't
running to Boeing for early orders.
Not sure 500 787s were "gifted away". One also has to consider that when
an outfit like Air Canada places an early order for close to 40 787s,
they'll get a substantial discount compared to an outfit like Air NZ
that initially ordered only 2. If most of the first 500 sales cnsisted
of large orders from a few large airlines, then the average price per
plane would be lower.
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2004/02/25/179853/dreamliner-on-sale-at-a-bargain-price.html
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/12/21/351212/flightblogger-the-price-of-boeings-787-sales-success.html
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flightblogger/2010/12/the-price-of-boeings-787-sales.html
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flightblogger/2010/12/21/Flightblogger-787-sales.pdf
Post by JF MezeiOf course, with the delays and delivery penalties, it is likely that
Boeing isn't going to be making much money on those aircraft.
They will have to sweat for a long time imho.
The initial cost calculations for production are completely down the drain.
Compare the initial list price (2/3 of an a330) to the current one.
The initial price was rebated ton an average of $76m for 2004..2006 sales ( ~400)
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinThe excess weight is a drag and much of the electric stuff is less KISS
than the previous tech iteration. Read what Bair has said on the topic.
Has the all electric concept added weight ?
YES
Post by JF MezeiIt is no surprise that the
787 is overweight compared to its initially very agressive sales
pitches.
But it will still be a better aircraft than the 787 and 330.
767 yes, A330 ? judges are still out. the -9 will achieve that eventually
Post by JF MezeiHere is an educated bet: The A350 will also be overweight. But it may be
less overweight than expected for a new airbus plane (since this time,
Airbus will put gtreater emphasis on weight savings).
I expect baby fat in the % dimensions of the A380. An endearing feature that
does not push performance below spec. ( compare to A380 )
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinJup. Boeing forgot to do meaningfull in depth research. You don't get anywhere
with NASA research grants when you don't have a master plan what you actually
want to achieve.
Based on the fact that the test 787 aircraft are not lawn darts,
You can kill with a lawn dart ;-)
But look at the stretch of fixed and snitches that filled the time
from the initial rollout ( lawn dart state) to an actually flyable
prototype ( ugly chick, still in need of a major makeover).
Post by JF MezeiI would
say that the all composite concept was not completely flawed.
Yes (black) plastics is enabling technology. Unfortunately I think Boeing
entered a tech cul de sac in their path taken.
Post by JF MezeiObviously,
execution and scheduling were flawed.
That is what entangled them for most of the time now, but the barrel approach
will hinder them in the future. ( They can't back of that without major faceloss ).
Bair already seems to have backed of the all electric stuff.
Post by JF MezeiConsider that if Boeing had announced a delay of 6 months PRIOR to
getting the suppliers to ship unfinished hauls just so it could have its
party on july 8th 2007, the 787 programme might have been much less
delayed because Boeing wouldn't have had to fiddle eternally with
assembled planes that needed disassembly, rivets changed etc.
That was my thought early on. but too many issues have surface later on
in the prototypes to have made much of a difference. There are so many
problems around that removing any single item ( or even half of them )
still would produce similar delays.
What would have helped is not starting series manufacture _before_ you
have one planeset assembled and tested in its basics.
How many borked A380 did Airbus have to fix?
( And that after FF and otherwise unremarkable testflying/qualification.)
Post by JF MezeiOr Boeing should have written off haul #1 after the party and then asked
the suppliers to get their act together and ship only completed sections.
Most emphatically YES. But no go : Management would have been quarted, killed,
fed to shareholders ( Hmm, A Good Thing (TM) ;-?)
I am completely surprised that the same faces still sit in about the same positions.
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinAfter Airbus announced the A380 Boeing was in a major bind for a new product.
Not sure if it was the A380, or Airbus gaining strength in sales which
got people to wonder where boeing was going. They tried to show some
innovation with sonic cruiser which flopped and after management change
came with the 787 which was the perfect project for boeing and with lots
of innovation. Perhaps too much innovation.
you bring it to a point "show some innovation" but only for "high gloos" reproduction.
Boeing imho has been traditionally badgered by customers for new types.
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinThe change from the 777 to the 787 was that with the latter partners
got a piece of disposable napkin with a rudimentary sketch of "what we
want from you".
That was partyly due to financing where Boeing shifted much financiang
responsability to partners who had to do much of teh design instead of
being given final blueprints and told to make 1000 widgets.
They completely forgot to define interfaces.
That not financial that is a mental deficiency.
Post by JF MezeiI think Boeing made a big mistake there and told manufacturers to start
producing stuff before plans were ready, and this was due to sales
people having made promises on a very tight deadline.
Ancillary: You can't buy trust in others competence. Trust in competence
requires that you yourself are competent on the issue.
this is an inaccessible idea for the MBA types. ( And see Qantas trip the
same trap recently. )
Post by JF MezeiIf sales had given Boeiong one extra year before first delivery, it is
possible that Boeing might have been reasonably on time because it could
have taken the time to do the job right before starting production.
could be, open to guesswork imho.
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinJapanese are not mad. Would you produce in advance pieces for an airframer
who changes spec every other month?
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/boeingaerospace/2009352316_airshowsuppliers180.html
That is scary then. I think one of the problems is that Boeing had
expected tape layup machines to be able to do certain quantities per
hour and the actual performance is much less. And the only way to
compensate is to buy a second machine and do 2 production lines.
Keyword is "expected" : one marketroid missleading the other, all happy Kubaja!
Post by JF MezeiConsidering the 3 year delay though, if supploers are not ready TODAY to
ramp up to 10 per month, then Boeing has a serious problem on its hand.
All supplioers shoudl have by today some plans to be able to ramp up to
10/month as soon as possible once real production begins.
Post by Uwe KleinSee: all the other suppliers and the assembly in the FAL are heavily entangled.
FAL is entangled because suppliers have not shipped sections that were
completed, and the FAL ends up having to undo work and then redo it
again. Once/if suppliers do their job as originally planned, the
production line should be more efficient. This is why Boeing should have
refused delivery of any hauls that were not completed, and send its
people to the suppliers to ensure whatever needed to be fixed was fixed
there instead of fixed at Boeing.
That would have required for Boeing to clean house first. You can't send
someone for fixing elsewhere if you haven't a single clue or is on the
wrong track altogether.
It is all "shimms". Boeing prototype design never learned to do a complete job
due to union people fixing all the nittle nits on the shopfloor ( and kept mum
about it ) "Preserving your value" ;-))
( this is a tidbid you can extract from the Boe<>moscow design office
interaction for 747-8* )
Post by JF MezeiThe whole business of traveled work should not have happened.
Yes. ( Don't despair, Airbus has traveled work too. )
Post by JF MezeiConsider that Airbus has had distributed manufacturing in different
countries all its life. Boeing has had similar with the 777.
The setup is different in major ways.
Interfaces, partitioning of work. ...
It must be. otherwise it is not explainable.
Post by JF MezeiThere is no
real reason why Boeing should have allowed the 787 to fail so badly
since it already had experience in distributing the manufacturing. As
you say, perhaps it is the distributed design where the real failures
occured.
How many dyed in the wool engineers and industrialisation planners have
survived the last 15 years at Boeing? Is there meaningfull continuity?
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe KleinThe hitch is you cannot take the customers missguided trust in Boeing
Prior to the 787, Boeing had a very good reputation. Its last new
aircraft, the 777 had a very good introduction into service. It was
airbus that had the bad reputation.
Airbus had a bad reputation?
Maybe in US minds. They grew (still are) continuously.
Post by JF MezeiPost by Uwe Klein* They have to accomodate a variable amount of fixes and changes
to an indeterminate number of frames.
But this is their own fault for accepting unfinished sections from
suppliers instead of forcing suppliers to finish them on site before
shipping to Boeing.
Post by Uwe KleinThere was talk around about delivering very recent ( or yet unbuild) frames
first and (much?)later feed the patchworked ones into the delivery stream
piecemeal.
A recent article I read stated that Boeing was starting to send aircraft
to Texas for refurbishement. I think haul #23 was being send down to be
fitted with all the changes that need to be made.
That has been planned for quite some time. The facility was bought 3/4 years ago?
Post by JF MezeiIn short, I think Boeing,s mistakle was allowing production to commence
before plans were truly complete and prototypes verified.
YES. But that is result not reason!
uwe
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